#### **Optimal Solutions with Bounded Inequality**

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- A growing interest\* in incorporating **fairness** into models
  - Health care resources.
  - Facility location (e.g., emergency services, infrastructure).
  - Telecommunications.
  - Traffic signal timing
  - Disaster recovery (e.g., power restoration)







- Example: Emergency facility location
  - Locations in densely populated zone minimize average response time, but are unfair to those in outlying areas
  - Locations that minimize worst-case response time result in poor service for most of the population
- A more equitable solution
  - ...would compromise between equity and efficiency.



- Example: Traffic signal timing
  - Throughput is maximized by giving constant green light to the major street, red light to cross street.
  - Then motorists on the cross street wait forever.
- A more **equitable** solution would find a compromise.
  - Similar issues in telecommunications, an early adopter of fairness modeling.



#### Example: Disaster relief

- Power restoration can focus on urban areas first (efficiency).
- This can leave rural areas without power for weeks/months.
- This happened in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria (2017).

#### A more equitable solution

 ...would give some priority to rural areas without overly sacrificing efficiency.



- The problem: How to incorporate **fairness** into an **optimization model**?
- Our approach: determine how various fairness models affect the structure of optimal solutions.



Özgün Elçi, John Hooker, Peter Zhang *The Structure of Fair Solutions: Achieving Fairness in an Optimization Model* Springer, forthcoming.

- We focus on two models that **maximize total utility** subject to a **bound on inequality**:
  - Inequality as measured by **range** of utilities.
  - Inequality as measured by **Gini coefficient**.

- We focus on two models that maximize total utility subject to a bound on inequality:
  - Inequality as measured by **range** of utilities.
  - Inequality as measured by **Gini coefficient**.
  - Structural results may help explain why societies historically tend to have 2 or 3 fairly homogeneous social classes.

- Optimization models are normally formulated to **maximize total utility**.
  - where utility = wealth, health, negative cost, etc.
  - This can lead to very unfair resource distribution.

• For example...

#### **Maximize Utility?**



#### **Maximize Utility?**



## **Modeling Equity/Efficiency Trade-off**

- Maximize utility subject to an inequality bound
  - Coefficient of variation (Jain's index)
  - Range
  - Gini coefficient
  - Hoover index
  - McLoone index

# **Modeling Equity/Efficiency Trade-off**

- Maximize utility subject to an inequality bound
  - Coefficient of variation (Jain's index)
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#### Maximize a social welfare function

- Alpha fairness (or Nash bargaining solution as special case)
- Beta fairness
- Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Utility threshold function
- Equity threshold function

#### **Modeling Equity/Efficiency Trade-off**

- Theorem: the optimal trade-off subject to a budget constraint divides stakeholders into 2 or 3 homogeneous classes...
  - ...when **maximizing utility** subject to **range** constraint, which is same as maximizing **equity threshold** function.
  - ...most surprisingly, when **maximizing utility** subject to constraint on **Gini coefficient**.



In general, the problem is

$$\max\left\{\sum_{i} u_{i} \mid \left| \sum_{i} a_{i} u_{i} \leq B; \mid u_{i} - u_{j} \right| \leq \Delta, \text{ all } i, j \right\}$$

- We **do not normalize** the range by the mean utility.
  - Otherwise, the problem is infeasible or has a purely utilitarian solution.
- For the same reason, we use an **unnormalized Gini** coefficient.

In general, the problem is

$$\max\left\{\sum_{i} u_{i} \mid \left| \sum_{i} a_{i} u_{i} \leq B; \mid u_{i} - u_{j} \right| \leq \Delta, \text{ all } i, j \right\}$$

Solutions have two possible patterns  $(a_1 \leq \cdots \leq a_n)$ 



- There are 2 or 3 groups of stakeholders •
  - If 3, the middle group contains **only 1** stakeholder, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> group has **zero** utility.
  - Everyone a group receives the same utility, even when the conversion efficiencies  $a_i$  differ.



$$a_1 \leq \cdots \leq a_n$$

- Maximizing utility with a range bound is equivalent to maximizing the equity threshold function
  - ...which combines utilitarian and maximin criteria



Generalization to *n* persons

$$W(\boldsymbol{u}) = n\Delta + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \min\{u_i - \Delta, u_{min}\}$$

- $\Delta$  is chosen so that well-off individuals **do not deserve more utility** unless utilities within  $\Delta$  of smallest are also increased.
- $\Delta = \infty$  corresponds to utilitarian,  $\Delta = 0$  to maximin.

#### **Equivalence theorem**

• Maximizing W(u) subject to a budget constraint gives the same solution as maximizing total utility subject to a budget constraint and range bound  $\Delta$ .

#### Example:



#### **Maximizing Utility with Gini Bound**

In general, the problem is

$$\max\left\{\sum_{i} u_{i} \left| \sum_{i} a_{i} u_{i} \leq B; \frac{1}{2n^{2}} \sum_{ij} |u_{i} - u_{j}| \leq D \right\}\right\}$$

Solutions have two possible patterns  $(a_1 \leq \cdots \leq a_n)$ 



#### **Maximizing Utility with Gini Bound**

- There are 2 or 3 groups of stakeholders
  - If 3, one group has **zero** utility.
  - The middle group can contain **multiple** stakeholders.



#### **Maximizing Utility with Gini Bound**

Why? If  $(a_1 \leq \cdots \leq a_n)$ , the problem can be written as an LP:

$$\max\left\{\sum_{i} u_{i} \left| \begin{array}{c} \sum_{i} a_{i}u_{i} \leq B\\ \sum_{i} (n-2i+1)u_{i} \leq n^{2}D\\ u_{i} \geq u_{i+1}, i = 1, \dots, n-1 \end{array} \right\}\right\}$$

Then the proof is based on duality and structure of a feasible basis.

#### **Maximizing utility with Gini Bound**



#### Conclusions

- Maximizing utility subject to an inequality bound creates 2 or 3 homogeneous classes.
  - In particular, when maximizing subject to a bound on range or Gini coefficient.
- This may help explain why societies historically tend to consist of **2 or 3 major social classes**.
  - And closer study of the optimality conditions may suggest how to **minimize class differences**.

# Questions or comments?